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Cultural studies: two paradigms

STUART HALL*

In serious, critical intellectual work, there are no ‘absolute beginnings’ and few unbroken continuities. Neither the endless unwinding of ‘tradition’, so beloved of the History of Ideas, nor the absolutism of the ‘epistemological rupture’, punctuating Thought into its ‘false’ and ‘correct’ parts, once favoured by the Althusserians, will do. What we find, instead, is an untidy but characteristic unevenness of development. What is important are the significant breaks—where old lines of thought are disrupted, older constellations displaced, and elements, old and new, are re-grouped around a different set of premises and themes. Changes in a problematic do significantly transform the nature of the questions asked, the forms in which they are proposed, and the manner in which they can be adequately answered. Such shifts in perspective reflect, not only the results of an internal intellectual labour, but the manner in which real historical developments and transformations are appropriated in thought, and provide ‘Thought, not with its guarantee of ‘correctness’ but with its fundamental orientations, its conditions of existence. It is because of this complex articulation between thinking and historical reality, reflected in the social categories of thought, and the continuous dialectic between knowledge and power’, that the breaks are worth recording.

Cultural Studies, as a distinctive problematic, emerges from one such moment, in the mid-1950s. It was certainly not the first time that its characteristic questions had been put on the table. Quite the contrary. The two books which helped to stake out the new terrain—Hoggart’s Uses of Literacy and Williams’s Culture And Society—were both, in different ways, works (in part) of recovery. Hoggart’s book took its reference from the ‘cultural debate’, long sustained in the arguments around ‘mass society’ and in the tradition of work identified with Lexis and Scrutiny. Culture And Society reconstructed a long tradition which Williams defined as consisting, in sum, of ‘a record of a number of important and continuing reactions to . . . changes in our social, economic and political life’ and offering ‘a special kind of map by means of which the nature of the changes can be explored’ (p. 16). The books looked, at first, simply like updating of these earlier concerns, with reference to the post-war world. Retrospectively, their ‘breaks’ with the traditions of thinking in which they were situated seem as important, if not more so, than their continuity with them. The Uses of Literacy did set out—much in the spirit of ‘practical criticism’—to read ‘working class culture for the values and meanings embodied in its patterns and arrangements: as if they were certain kinds of ‘texts’. But the application of this method to a living culture, and the rejection of the terms of the ‘cultural debate’ (polarized around the high/low culture distinction) was a thorough-going departure. Culture And Society—

* The Open University.
'Culture' was the site of the convergence. But what definitions of this core concept emerged from this body of work? And, since this line of thinking has decisively shaped Cultural Studies, and represents the most formative indigenous or 'native' tradition, around what space was its concerns and concepts unified? The fact is that no single, unproblematic definition of 'culture' is to be found here. The concept remains a complex one—a site of convergent interests, rather than a logically or conceptually clarified idea. This 'richness' is an area of continuing tension and difficulty in the field. It might be useful, therefore, briefly to resume the characteristic stresses and emphases through which the concept has arrived at its present state of (in-)determinacy. (The characterizations which follow are, necessarily crude and over-simplified, synthesizing rather than carefully analytic. Two main problematics only are discussed.

Two rather different ways of conceptualizing 'culture' can be drawn out of the many suggestive formulations in Raymond Williams's *Long Revolution*. The first relates 'culture' to the sum of the available descriptions through which societies make sense of and reflect their common experiences. This definition takes up the earlier stress on 'ideas', but subjects it to a thorough reworking. The conception of 'culture' is itself democratized and socialized. It no longer consists of the sum of the 'best that has been thought and said', regarded as the summits of an achieved civilization—that ideal of perfection to which, in earlier usage, all aspired. Even 'art'—assigned in the earlier framework a privileged position, as touchstone of the highest values of civilization—is now redefined as only one, special, form of a general social process: the giving and taking of meanings, and the slow development of 'common' meanings—a common culture: 'culture', in this special sense, is 'ordinary' (to borrow the title of one of Williams's earliest attempts to make his general position more widely accessible). If even the highest, most refined of descriptions offered in works of literature are also 'part of the general process which creates conventions and institutions, through which the meanings that are valued by the community are shared and made active' (p. 55), then there is no way in which this process can be hived off or distinguished or set apart from the other practices of the historical process: 'Since our way of seeing things is literally our way of living, the process of communication is in fact the process of community: the sharing of common meanings, and thence common activities and purposes; the offering, reception and comparison of new meanings, leading to tensions and achievements of growth and change' (p. 55).

Accordingly, there is no way in which the communication of descriptions, understood in this way, can be set aside and compared externally with other things. If the art is part of society, there is no solid whole, outside it, to which, by the form of our question, we concede priority. The art is there, as an activity, with the production, the trading, the politics, the raising of families. To study the relations adequately we must study them actively, seeing all activities as particular and contemporary forms of human energy.

If this first emphasis takes up and re-works the connotation of the term 'culture' with the domain of 'ideas', the second emphasis is more deliberately anthropological, and emphasizes that aspect of 'culture' which refers to social practices. It is from this second emphasis that the somewhat simplified definition—'culture is a whole way of life'—has been rather too neatly abstracted. Williams did relate this aspect of the concept to the more 'documentary'—that is, descriptive, even ethnographic—usage of the term. But the earlier definition seems to me the more central one, into which 'way of life' is integrated. The important point in the argument rests on the active and indissoluble relationships between elements or social practices normally separated...
out. It is in this context that the 'theory of culture' is defined as 'the study of relationships between elements in a whole way of life'. 'Culture' is not a practice, nor is it simply the descriptive sum of the 'mores and folkways' of societies—as it tended to become in certain kinds of anthropology. It is threaded through all social practices, and is the sum of their inter-relationship. The question of what, then, is studied, and how, resolves itself. The 'culture' is those patterns of organization, those characteristic forms of human energy which can be discovered as revealing themselves—in unexpected identifications of communities' as well as in 'discontinuities of an unexpected kind' (p. 63)—within or underlying all social practices. The analysis of culture is, then, 'the attempt to discover the nature of the organization which is the context of these complexes'. It begins with 'the discovery of patterns of a characteristic kind'. One will discover them, not in the art, production, trading, politics, the raising of families, treated as separate activities, but through 'studying a general organization in a particular example' (p. 61). Analytically, one must study the relationships between these patterns'. The purpose of the analysis is to grasp how the interactions between all these practices and patterns are lived and experienced as a whole, in any particular period. This is its 'structure of feeling'.

It is easier to see what Williams was getting at, and why he was pushed along this path, if we understand what were the problems he addressed, and what pitfalls he was trying to avoid. This is particularly necessary because The Long Revolution (like many of Williams's work) carries on a submerged, almost 'silent' dialogue with alternative positions, which are not always clearly identified as one would wish. There is a clear engagement with the 'idealist' and 'civilizing' definitions of culture—both the equation of 'culture' with 'ideas', in the idealist tradition; and the assimilation of culture to an 'ideal', prevalent in the elitist terms of the 'cultural debate'. But there is also a more extended engagement with certain kinds of Marxism, against which Williams's definitions are consciously pitched. He is arguing against the literal operations of the base/superstructure metaphor, which in classical Marxism ascribed the domain of 'ideas' and of meanings to the 'superstructures', themselves conceived as merely reflective of and determined in some simple fashion by the base'; without a social effectivity of their own. That is to say, his argument is constructed against a vulgar materialism and an economic determinism. He offers, instead, a radical interactionism: in effect, the interaction of all practices in and with one another, skirting the problem of determinacy. The distinctions between practices is overcome by seeing them all as variant forms of praxis—of a general human activity and energy. The underlying patterns which distinguish the complex of practices in any specific society at any specific time are the characteristic 'forms of its organization' which underlie them all, and which can therefore be traced in each.

There have been several, radical revisions of this early position: and each has contributed much to the redefinition of what Cultural Studies is and should be. We have acknowledged already the exemplary nature of Williams's project, in constantly rethinking and revising earlier arguments—in going on thinking. Nevertheless, one is struck by a marked line of continuity through these seminal revisions. One such moment is that his recognition of Lucien Goldman's work, and through him, of the array of marxist thinkers who had given particular attention to superstructural forms and whose work began, for the first time, to appear in English translation in the mid-1960s. The contrast between the alternative marxist traditions which sustained writers like Goldman and Lukacs, as compared with Williams's isolated position and the impoverished marxist tradition he had to draw on, is sharply delineated. But the points of convergence—both what they are against, and what they are about—are identified in ways which are not altogether out of line with his earlier arguments. Here is the negative, which he sees as linking his work to Goldman's: 'I came to believe that I had to give up, or at least to leave aside, what I knew as the marxist tradition: to attempt to develop a theory of social totality; to see the study of culture as the study of relations between elements in a whole way of life; to find ways of studying structure... which could stay in touch with and illuminate particular art works and forms, but also forms and relations of more general social life; to replace the formula of base and superstructure with the more active idea of a field of mutually if also unevenly determining forces' (NLR 67, May-June 1971). And here is the positive—the point where the convergence is marked between Williams's 'structure of feeling' and Goldman's 'genegetic structuralism': 'I found in my own work that I had to develop the idea of a structure of feeling... But then I found Goldmann beginning... from a concept of structure which contained, in itself, a relation between social and literary facts. This relation, he insisted, was not a matter of content, but of mental structures: *categories which simultaneously organize the empirical consciousness of a particular social group, and the imaginative world created by the writer*'. By definition, these structures are not individually but collectively created. The stress there on the interactivity of practices and on the underlying totalities, and the homologies between them, is characteristic and significant. 'A correspondence of content between a writer and his world is less significant than this correspondence of organization of structure'.

A second such 'moment' is the point where Williams really takes on board E. P. Thompson's critique of The Long Revolution (cf. the review in NLR 9 and 10) that 'no whole way of life' is without its dimension of struggle and confrontation between opposed ways of life—and attempts to rethink the key issues of determination and domination via Gramsci's concept of hegemony. This essay (Base and Superstructure, NLR 82, 1973) is a seminal one, especially in its elaboration of dominant, residual and emergent cultural practices, and its return to the problematic of determinacy as 'limits and pressures'. None the less, the earlier emphasis recur, with force: 'we cannot separate literature and art from other kinds of social practice, in such a way as to make them subject to quite special and distinct laws'. And, 'no mode of production, and therefore no dominant society or order of society, and therefore no dominant culture, in reality exhausts human practice, human energy, human intention'. And this note is carried forward—indeed, it is radically accentuated—in Williams's most sustained and succinct recent statement of his position: the masterly condensations of Marxism And Literature. Against the structuralist emphasis on the specificity and 'autonomy' of practices, and their analytic separation of societies into their discrete instances, Williams's stress is on 'constitutive activity' in general, on 'sensitive human activity, as practice', from Marx's first thesis on Feuerbach; on different practices conceived as a 'whole indissoluble practice'; on totality. Thus, contrary to one development in Marxism, it is not 'the base' and 'the superstructure' that need to be studied, but specific and indissoluble real processes, within which the decisive relationship, from a marxist point of view, is that expressed by the complex idea of 'determination' (M & L pp. 30–31, 82).

At one level, Williams's and Thompson's work can only be said to converge around the terms of the same problematic through the operation of a violent and schematically dichotomous theorization. The organizing terrain of Thompson's work—classes as relations, popular struggle, and historical forms of consciousness, class cultures in
their historical particularity—is foreign to the more reflective and ‘generalizing’ mode in which Williams typically works. And the dialogue between them begins with a very sharp encounter. The review of The Long Revolution, which Thompson undertook, took Williams sharply to task for the evolutionary way in which culture as a ‘whole way of life’ had been conceptualized; for his tendency to absorb conflicts between class cultures into the terms of an extended ‘conversation’; for his impersonal tone—above the contending classes, as it were; and for the imperializing sweep of his concept of ‘culture’ (which, heterogeneously, swept everything into its orbit because it was the study of the interrelationships between the forms of energy and organization underlying all practices. But wasn’t this—Thompson asked—where History came in?) Progressively, we can see how Williams has persistently rethought the terms of his original paradigm to take these criticisms into account—though this is accomplished (as it so frequently is in Williams) obliquely: via a particular appropriation of Gramsci, rather than in a more direct modification.

Thompson also operates with a more ‘classical’ distinction than Williams, between ‘social being’ and ‘social consciousness’ (the terms he infinitely prefers, from Marx, to the more fashionable ‘base and superstructure’). Thus, where Williams insists on the absorption of all practices into the totality of ‘real, indissoluble practice’, Thompson does deploy an older distinction between what is ‘culture’ and what is ‘not culture’. ‘Any theory of culture must include the concept of the dialectical interaction between culture and something that is not culture’. Yet the definition of culture is not, after all, so far removed from Williams’s: ‘We must suppose the raw material of life experience to be at one pole, and all the infinitely complex human disciplines and systems, articulate and inarticulate, formalised in institutions or dispersed in the least formal ways, which “handle”, transmit or distort this raw material to be at the other’. Similarly, with respect to the commonality of ‘practice’ which underlies all the distinct practices: ‘It is the active process—which is at the same time the process through which men make their history—that I am insisting upon’ (NLR 9, p. 33, 1961). And the two positions come close together around—again—certain distinctive negatives and positives. Negatively, against the ‘base/superstructure’ metaphor, and a reductionist or ‘economistic’ definition of determinacy. On the first: ‘The dialectical intercourse between social being and social consciousness—or between “culture” and “not culture”—is at the heart of any comprehension of the historical process within the Marxist tradition... The tradition inheres a dialectic that is right, but the particular mechanical metaphor through which it is expressed is wrong. This metaphor from constructional engineering... must in any case be inadequate to describe the flux of conflict, the dialectic of a changing social process... All the metaphors which are commonly offered have a tendency to lead the mind into schematic modes and away from the interaction of being-consciousness’. And on ‘reductionism’: ‘Reductionism is a lapse in historical logic by which political or cultural events are “explained” in terms of the class affiliations of the actors... But the mediation between “interest” and “belief” was not through Nairn’s “complex of superstructures” but through the people themselves’ (‘Peculiarities of the English’, Socialist Register, 1965, pp. 351–352). And, more positively—a simple statement which may be taken as defining virtually the whole of Thompson’s historical work, from The Making to Whigs And Hunters, The Poverty of Theory and beyond—capitalist society was founded upon forms of exploitation which are simultaneously economic, moral and cultural. Take up the essential defining productive relationship... and turn it round, and it reveals itself now in one aspect (wage-labour), now in another (an acquisitive ethos), and now in another (the alienation of such intellectual faculties as are not required by the workers in his productive role)’ (ibid., p. 356).

Here, then, despite the many significant differences, is the outline of one significant line of thinking in Cultural Studies—some would say, the dominant paradigm. It stands opposed to the residual and merely-reflective role assigned to ‘the cultural’. In its different ways, it conceptualizes culture as interwoven with all social practices; and those practices, in turn, as a common form of human activity: sensuous human praxis, the activity through which men and women make history. It is opposed to the base-superstructure way of formulating the relationship between ideal and material forces, especially where the ‘base’ is defined as the determination by ‘the economic’ in any simple sense. It prefers the wider formulation—the dialectic between social being and social consciousness: neither separable into its distinct poles (in some alternative formulations, the dialectic between ‘culture’ and ‘non-culture’). It defines ‘culture’ as both the meanings and values which arise amongst distinctive social groups and classes, on the basis of their given historical conditions and relationships, through which they ‘handle’ and respond to the conditions of existence; and as the lived traditions and practices through which those ‘understandings’ are expressed and in which they are embodied. Williams brings together these two aspects—definitions and ways of life—around the concept of ‘culture’ itself. Thompson brings the two elements—consciousness and conditions—around the concept of ‘experience’. Both positions entail certain difficult fluctuations around these key terms. Williams so totally absorbs ‘definitions of experience’ into our ‘ways of living’, and both into an indissoluble real material practice-in-general, as to obviate any distinction between ‘culture’ and ‘not-culture’. Thompson sometimes uses ‘experience’ in the more usual sense of consciousness, as the collective ways in which men ‘handle, transmit or distort’ their given conditions, the raw materials of life; sometimes as the domain of the ‘lived’, the mid-term between ‘conditions’ and ‘culture’; and sometimes as the objective conditions themselves—against which particular modes of consciousness are counterposed. But, whatever the terms, both positions tend to read structures of relations in terms of how they are ‘lived’ and ‘experienced’. Williams’s ‘structure of feeling’—with its deliberate condensation of apparently incompatible elements—is characteristic. But the same is true of Thompson, despite his far fuller historical grasp of the ‘given-ness’ or structuredness of the relations and conditions into which men and women necessarily and involuntarily enter, and his clearer attention to the determinacy of productive and exploitative relations under capitalism. This is a consequence of giving culture-consciousness and experience so pivotal a place in the analysis. The experiential pull in this paradigm, and the emphasis on the creative and on historical agency, constitutes the two key elements in the humanism of the position outlined. Each, consequently accords ‘experience’ an authenticating position in any cultural analysis. It is, ultimately, where and how people experience their conditions of life, define them and respond to them, which, for Thompson defines why every mode of production is also a culture, and every struggle between classes is always also a struggle between cultural modalities; and which, for Williams, is what a ‘cultural analysis’, in the final instance, should deliver. In ‘experience’, all the different practices intersect: within ‘culture’ the different practices interact—even if on an uneven and mutually determining basis. This sense of cultural totality—of the whole historical process—over-rides any effort to keep the instances and elements distinct. Their real interconnection, under given historical conditions, must be matched by a totalizing movement ‘in thought’, in the analysis. It establishes for both the strongest
protocols against any form of analytic abstraction which distinguishes practices, or which sets out to test the 'actual historical movement' in all its intertwined complexity and particularity by any more sustained logical or analytical operation. These positions, especially in their more concrete historical rendering (The Making, The Country And The City) are the very opposite of a Hegelian search for underlying essences. Yet, in their tendency to reduce practices to praxis and to find common and homologous 'forms' underlying the most apparently differentiated areas, their movement is 'essentialising'. They have a particular way of understanding the totality—though it is with a small 't', concrete and historically determine, uneven in its correspondences. They understand it 'expressively'. And since they constantly inflect the more traditional analysis towards the experiential level, or read the other structures and relations downwards from the vantage point of how they are 'lived', they are properly (even if not adequately or fully) characterized as 'culturalist' in their emphasis: even when all the cavents and qualifications against a too rapid 'dichotomous theorizing' have been entered. (C.f. for 'culturalism', Richard Johnson's two seminal articles on the operation of the paradigm: in 'Histories of Culture/ Theories of Ideology', Ideology And Cultural Production, eds M. Barrett, P. Corrigan et al., Croom Helm, 1979, and 'Three Problematics' in Working Class Culture: Clarke, Crichter and Johnson, Hutchinsons and CCCS, 1979. For the dangers in 'dichotomous theorizing', cf. the Introduction, 'Representation and Cultural Production', to Barrett, Corrigan et al.)

The 'culturalist' strand in Cultural Studies was interrupted by the arrival on the intellectual scene of the 'structuralisms'. These, possibly more varied than the 'culturalisms', nevertheless shared certain positions and orientations in common which makes their designation under a single title not altogether misleading. It has been remarked that whereas the 'culturalist' paradigm can be defined without requiring a conceptual reference to the term 'ideology' (the word, of course, does appear; but it is not a key concept), the 'structuralist' interventions have been largely articulated around the concept of 'ideology': in keeping with its more impeccably Marxist lineage, 'culture' does not figure so prominently. Whilst this may be true of the Marxist structuralists, it is at best less than half the truth about the structuralist enterprise as such. But it is now a common error to condense the latter exclusively around the impact of Althusser and all that has followed in the wake of his interventions—where 'ideology' has played a seminal, but modulated role: and to omit the significance of Levi-Strauss. Yet, in strict historical terms, it was Levi-Strauss, and the early semiotics, which made the first break. And though the Marxist structuralisms have superseded the latter, they owed, and continue to owe, an immense theoretical debt (often fended off or down-graded into footnotes, in the search for a retrospective orthodoxy) to his work. It was Levi-Strauss's structuralism which, in its appropriation of the linguistic paradigm, after Saussure, offered the promise to the 'human sciences of culture' of a paradigm capable of rendering them scientific and rigorous in a thoroughly new way. And when, in Althusser's work, the more classical Marxist themes were recovered, it remained the case that Marx was 'read'—and reconstituted—through the terms of the linguistic paradigm. In Reading Capital, for example, the case is made that the mode of production—to coin a phrase—could best be understood as if 'structured like a language' (through the selective combination of invariant elements). The a-historical and synchronic stress, against the historical emphases of 'culturalism', derived from a similar source. So did a preoccupation with 'the social, sui generis'—used not adjectively but substantively: a usage Levi-Strauss derived, not from Marx, but from Durkheim (the Durkheim who analysed the social categories of thought—e.g. in Primitive Classification—rather than the Durkheim of The Division Of Labour, who became the founding father of American structural-functionalism).

Levi-Strauss did, on occasion, toy with certain Marxist formulations. Thus, 'Marxism, if not Marx himself, has too commonly reasoned as though practices followed directly from praxis. Without questioning the undoubted primacy of infrastructures, I believe that there is always a mediator between praxis and practices, namely, the conceptual scheme by the operation of which matter and form, neither with any independent existence, are realized as structures, that is as entities which are both empirical and intelligible'. But this—to coin another phrase—was largely 'gestural'. This structuralism shared with culturalism a radical break with the terms of the base/superstructure metaphor, as derived from the simpler parts of the German Ideology. And, though 'it is to this theory of the superstructures, scarcely touched on by Marx' to which Levi-Strauss aspired to contribute, his contribution was such as to break in a radical way with its whole terms of reference, as finally and irrevocably as the 'culturalists' did. Here—and we must include Althusser in this characterization—culturalists and structuralists alike ascribed to the domains hitherto defined as 'superstructural' a specificity and effectivity, a constitutive primacy, which pushed them beyond the terms of reference of 'base' and 'superstructure'. Levi-Strauss and Althusser, too, were anti-reductionist and anti-economist in their very cast of thought, and critically attacked that transitive causality which, for so long, had passed itself off as 'classical Marxism'.

Levi-Strauss worked consistently with the term 'culture'. He regarded 'ideologies' as of much lesser importance: mere 'secondary rationalizations'. Like Williams and Goldmann, he worked, not at the level of correspondences between the content of a practice, but at the level of their forms and structures. But the manner in which these were conceptualized were altogether at variance with either the 'culturalism' of Williams or Goldmann's 'genetic structuralism'. This divergence can be identified in three distinct ways. First, he conceptualized 'culture' as the categories and frameworks in thought and language through which different societies classified out their conditions of existence—above all (since Levi-Strauss was an anthropologist), the relations between the human and the natural worlds. Second, he thought of the manner and practice through which these categories and mental frameworks were produced and transformed, largely on an analogy with the ways in which language itself—the principal medium of 'culture'—operated. He identified what was specific to them and their operation as the 'production of meaning': they were, above all, 'signifying practices'. Third, after some early flirtations with Durkheim and Mauss's social categories of thought, he largely gave up the question of the relation between signifying and non-signifying practices—between 'culture' and 'not-culture', to use other terms—for the sake of concentrating on the internal relations within signifying practices by means of which the categories of meaning were produced. This left the question of determinacy, of totality, largely in abeyance. The causal logic of determinacy was abandoned in favour of a structuralist causality—a logic of arrangement, of internal relations, of articulation of parts within a structure. Each of these aspects is also positively present in Althusser's work and that of the Marxist structuralists, even when the terms of reference had been re-grounded in Marx's 'immense theoretical revolution'. In one of Althusser's seminal formulations about ideology—defined as the themes, concepts and representations through which men and women 'live', in
an imaginary relation, their relation to their real conditions of existence—we can see the skeleton outline of Levi-Strauss's 'conceptual schemes between praxis and practices'. 'Ideologies' are here being conceptualized, not as the contents and surface forms of ideas, but as the unconscious categories through which conditions are represented and lived. We have already commented on the active presence in Althusser's thinking of the linguistic paradigm—the second element identified above. And though, in the concept of 'over-determination'—one of his most seminal and fruitful contributions—Althusser did return to the problem of the relations between practices and the question of determinacy (proposing, incidentally, a thoroughly novel and highly suggestive reformulation, which has received far too little subsequent attention), he did tend to reinforce the 'relative autonomy' of different practices, and their internal specificities, conditions and effects at the expense of an 'expressive' conception of the totality, with its typical homologies and correspondences. 

Aside from the wholly distinct intellectual and conceptual universes within which these alternative paradigms developed, there were certain points where, despite their apparent overlaps, culturalism and structuralism were starkly counterposed. We can identify this counterpoint at one of its sharpest points precisely around the concept of 'experience', and the role the term played in each perspective. Whereas, in 'culturalism', experience was the ground—the terrain of 'the lived'—where consciousness and conditions intersected, structuralism insisted that 'experience' could not, by definition, be the ground of anything, since one could only 'live' experience as a condition in and through the categories, classifications, and frameworks of the culture. These categories, however, did not arise from or in experience: rather, experience was their 'effect'. The culturalists had defined the forms of consciousness and culture as collective. But they had stopped far short of the radical proposition that, in culture and in language, the subject was 'spoken by' the categories of culture in which he/she thought, rather than 'speaking them'. These categories were, however, not merely collective rather than individual productions: they were unconscious structures. That is why, though Levi-Strauss spoke only of 'Culture', his concept provided the basis for an easy translation, by Althusser, into the conceptual framework of ideology: 'Ideology is indeed a system of "representations", but in the majority of cases these representations have nothing to do with "consciousness":... it is above all as structures that they impose on the vast majority of men, not via their "consciousness"... it is within this ideological unconsciousness that men succeed in altering the "lived" relation between them and the world and acquiring that new form of specific unconscious called "consciousness"' (For Marx, p. 233). 

It was, in this sense, that 'experience' was conceived, not as an authenticating source but as an effect: not as a reflection of the real but as an 'imaginary relation'. It was only a short step—the one which separates For Marx from the 'Ideological State Apparatuses' essay—to the development of an account of how this 'imaginary relation' served, not simply the dominance of a ruling class over a dominated one, but through the reproduction of the relations of production, and the constitution of labour-power in a form fit for capitalist exploitation the expanded reproduction of the mode of production itself. Many of the other lines of divergence between the two paradigms flow from this point: the conception of 'men' as bearers of the structures that speak and place them, rather than as active agents in the making of their own history; the emphasis on a structural rather than a historical 'logic'; the preoccupation with the constitution—in 'theory'—of a non-ideological, scientific discourse; and hence the privileging of conceptual work and of Theory as guaranteed; the recasting of history as a march of the structures (cf. passim, The Poverty of Theory): the structuralist 'machine'...

There is no space in which to follow through the many ramifications which have followed from the development of one or other of these 'master paradigms' in Cultural Studies. Though they by no means account for all, or even nearly all, of the many strategies adopted, it is fair to say that, between them, they have defined the principal lines of development in the field. The seminal debates have been polarized around their themes; some of the best concrete work has flowed from the efforts to set one or other of these paradigms to work on particular problems and materials. Characteristically—the sectarian and self-righteous climate of critical intellectual work in England being what it is, and its dependency being so marked—the arguments and debates have most frequently been over-polarized into their extremes. At these extremes, they frequently appear only as mirror-reflections or inversions of one another. Here, the broad typologies we have been working with—for the sake of convenient exposition—become the prison-house of thought.

Without suggesting that there can be any easy synthesis between them, it might usefully be said at this point that neither 'culturalism' nor 'structuralism' is, in its present manifestation, adequate to the task of constructing the study of culture as a conceptually clarified and theoretically informed domain of study. Nevertheless, something fundamental to it emerges from a rough comparison of their respective strengths and limitations.

The great strength of the structuralisms is their stress on 'determinate conditions'. They remind us that, unless the dialectic really can be held, in any particular analysis, between both halves of the proposition—that 'men make history... on the basis of conditions which are not of their making'—the result will inevitably be a naive humanism, with its necessary consequence: a voluntarist and populist political practice. The fact that 'men' can become conscious of their conditions, organize to struggle against them and in fact transform them—without which no active politics can even be conceived, let alone practised—must not be allowed to obscure the awareness of the fact that, in capitalist relations, men and women are placed and positioned in relations which constitute them as agents. The 'phenomenology of the intellect, optimism of the will' is a better starting point than a simple heroic affirmation. Structuralism does enable us to begin to think—as Marx insisted—of the relations of a structure on the basis of something other than their reduction to relationships between 'people'. This was Marx's privileged level of abstraction: that which enabled him to break with the obvious but incorrect starting point of 'political economy'—bare individuals.

But this connects with a second strength: the recognition by structuralism not only of the necessity of abstraction as the instrument of thought through which 'real relations' are appropriated, but also of the presence, in Marx's work, of a continuous and complex movement between different levels of abstraction. It is, of course, the case—as 'culturalism' argues—that, in historical reality, practices do not appear neatly distinguished out into their respective instances. However, to think about or to analyse the complexity of the real, the act of practice of thinking is required; and this necessitates the use of the power of abstraction and analysis, the formation of concepts with which to cut into the complexity of the real, in order precisely to reveal and bring to light relationships and structures which cannot be visible to the naive naked eye, and which can neither present nor authenticate themselves: 'in the analysis of economic forms, neither microscopes nor chemical reagents are of assistance. The
power of abstraction must replace both. Of course, structuralism has frequently taken this proposition to its extreme. Because thought is impossible without 'the power of abstraction', it has confused this with giving an absolute primacy to the level of the formation of concepts—and at the highest, most abstract level of abstraction only: Theory with a capital "T" then becomes judge and jury. But this is precisely to lose the insight just won from Marx's own practice. For it is clear in, for example, Capital, that the method—whilst, of course, taking place 'in thought' (as Marx asked in the 1857 Introduction, where else?)—rests not on the simple exercise of abstraction but on the movement and relations which the argument is constantly establishing between different levels of abstraction: at each, the premises in play must be distinguished from those which—for the sake of the argument—have to be held constant. The movement to another level of magnification (to deploy the microscope metaphor) requires the specifying of further conditions of existence not supplied at a previous, more abstract level: in this way, by successive abstractions of different magnitudes, to move towards the constitution, the reproduction, of the concrete in thought as an effect of a certain kind of thinking. This method is adequately represented in neither the absolutism of Theoretical Practice, in structuralism, nor in the anti-abstraction 'Poverty Of Theory' proposition into which, in reaction, culturalism appears to have been driven or driven itself. Nevertheless it is intrinsically theoretical, and must be. Here, structuralism's insistence that thought does not reflect reality, but is articulated on and appropriate to it, is a necessary starting point. An adequate working through of the consequences of this argument might begin to produce a method which takes us outside the permanent oscillations between abstraction/anti-abstraction and the false dichotomies of Theoreticism et. Empiricism which have both marked and disfigured the structuralism/culturalism encounter to date.

Structuralism has another strength, in its conception of 'the whole'. There is a sense in which, through culturalism constantly insists on the radical particularity of its practices, its mode of conceptualizing the 'totality' has something of the complex simplicity of an expressive totality behind it. Its complexity is constituted by the fluidity with which practices move into and out of another: but this complexity is reducible, conceptually, to the 'simplicity' of praxis—human activity, as such—in which the same contradictions constantly appear, homologically reflected in each. Structuralism goes too far in erecting the machine of a 'Structure', with its self-generating propensities (a 'Spinезeal eternity', whose function is only the sum of its effects: a truly structuralist deviation), equipped with its distinctive instances. Yet it represents an advance over culturalism in the conception it has of the necessary complexity of the unity of a structure (over-determination being a more successful way of thinking this complexity than the combinatory invariance of structuralist causality). Moreover, it has the conceptual ability to think of a unity which is constructed through the differences between, rather than the homology of, practices. Here, again, it has won a critical insight about Marx's method: one thinks of the complex passages of the 1857 Introduction to the Grundrisse where Marx demonstrates how it is possible to think of the 'unity' of a social formation as constructed, not out of identity but out of difference. Of course, the stress on difference can—and has—led the structuralists into a fundamental conceptual heterogeneity, in which all sense of structure and totality is lost. Foucault and other post-Althusserians have taken this devious path into the absolute, not the relative, autonomy of practices, via their necessary heterogeneity and 'necessary non-correrespondence'. But the emphasis on unity-in-difference, on complex unity—Marx's concrete as the 'unity of many determinations'—can be worked in another, and ultimately more fruitful direction: towards the problematic of relative autonomy and 'over-determination', and the study of articulation. Again, articulation contains the danger of a high formalism. But it also has the considerable advantage of enabling us to think of how specific practices (articulated around contradictions which do not all arise in the same way, at the same point, in the same moment), can nevertheless be thought together. The structuralist paradigm thus does—if properly developed—enable us to begin really to conceptualize the specificity of different practices (analytically distinguished, abstracted out), without losing its grip on the ensemble which they constitute. Culturalism constantly affirms the specificity of different practices—'culture' must not be absorbed into 'the economic': but it lacks an adequate way of establishing this specificity theoretically.

The third strength which structuralism exhibits lies in its decentering of 'experience' and its seminal work in elaborating the neglected category of 'ideology'. It is difficult to conceive of a Cultural Studies thought within a Marxist paradigm which is innocent of the category of 'ideology'. Of course, culturalism constantly makes reference to this concept: but it does not in fact lie at the centre of its conceptual universe. The authenticating power and reference of 'experience' imposes a barrier between culturalism and a proper conception of 'ideology'. Yet, without it, the effectivity of 'culture' for the reproduction of a particular mode of production cannot be grasped. It is true that there is a marked tendency in the most recent structuralist conceptualisations of 'ideology' to give it a functionalist reading—as the necessary cement of the social formation. From this position, it is indeed impossible—as culturalism would correctly argue—to conceive either of ideologies which are not, by definition, 'dominant': or of the concept of struggle (the latter's appearance in Althusser's famous ISA's article being—to coin yet another phrase—largely 'gestural'). Nevertheless, work is already being done which suggests ways in which the field of ideology may be adequately conceptualized as a terrain of struggle (through the work of Gramsci, and more recently, of Laclau), and these have structuralist rather than culturalist bearings.

Culturalism's strength can almost be derived from the weaknesses of the structuralist position already noted, and from the latter's strategic absences and silences. It has insisted, correctly, on the affirmative moment of the development of conscious struggle and organization as a necessary element in the analysis of history, ideology and consciousness: against its persistent down-grading in the structuralist paradigm. Here, again, it is largely Gramsci who has provided us with a set of more refined terms through which to link the largely 'unconscious' and given cultural categories of 'common sense' with the formation of more active and organic ideologies, which have the capacity to intervene in the ground of common sense and popular traditions and, through such interventions, to organize masses of men and women. In this sense, culturalism properly restores the dialectic between the unconsciousness of cultural categories and the moment of conscious organization: even if, in its characteristic movement, it has tended to match structuralism's over-emphasis on 'conditions' with an altogether too-inclusive emphasis on 'consciousness'. It therefore not only recovers—as the necessary moment of any analysis—the process by means of which classes-in-themselves, defined primarily by the way in which economic relations position men as agents—become active historical and political forces—for-themselves: it also—against its own anti-theoretical good sense—requires that, when properly developed, each moment must be understood in terms of the level of abstraction at which the analysis is operating. Again, Gramsci has begun to point a way through
structures of cultural production are more significant than their cultural-ideological aspect: and that these are quite adequately caught in the more classical terminology of profit, exploitation, surplus-value and the analysis of culture as commodity. It retains a notion of ideology as 'false consciousness'.

There is, of course, some strength to the claim that both structuralism and culturalism, in their different ways, have neglected the economic analysis of cultural and ideological production. All the same, with the return to this more 'classical' terrain, many of the problems which originally beset it also reappear. The specificity of the effect of the cultural and ideological dimension once more tends to disappear. It tends to conceive the economic level as not only a 'necessary' but a 'sufficient' explanation of cultural and ideological effects. Its focus on the analysis of the commodity form, similarly, blurs all the carefully established distinctions between different practices, since it is the most generic aspects of the commodity-form which attract attention. Its deductions are therefore, largely, confined to an epochal level of abstraction: the generalizations about the commodity-form hold true throughout the capitalist epoch as a whole. Very little by way of concrete and conjunctural analysis can be derived at this high-level 'logic of capital' form of abstraction. It also tends to its own kind of functionalism—a functionalism of 'logic' rather than of 'structure' or history. This approach, too, has insights which are well worth following through. But it sacrifices too much of what has been painfully secured, without a compensating gain in explanatory power.

The third position is closely related to the structuralist enterprise, but has followed the path of 'difference' through into a radical heterogeneity. Foucault's work currently enjoying another of those uncritical periods of discipleship through which British intellectuals reproduce today their dependency on yesterday's French ideas—has had an exceedingly positive effect: above all because—in suspending the nearly-insoluble problems of determination Foucault has made possible a welcome return to the concrete analysis of particular ideological and discursive formations, and the sites of their elaboration. Foucault and Gramsci between them account for much of the most productive work on concrete analysis now being undertaken in the field: thereby reinforcing and—paradoxically—supporting the sense of the concrete historical instance which has always been one of culturalism's principal strengths. But, again, Foucault's example is positive only if his general epistemological position is not swallowed whole. For in fact Foucault so resolutely suspends judgment, and adopts so thoroughgoing a scepticism about any determinacy or relationship between practices, other than the largely contingent, that we are entitled to see him, not as an agnostic on these questions, but as deeply committed to the necessary non-correspondence of all practices to one another. From such a position neither a social formation, nor the State, can be adequately thought. And indeed Foucault is constantly falling into the pit which he has dug for himself. For when—against his well-defended epistemological positions—he stumbles across certain 'correspondences' (for example, the simple fact that all the major moments of transition he has traced in each of his studies—on the prison, sexuality, medicine, the asylum, language and political economy—all appear to converge around exactly that point where industrial capitalism and the bourgeoisie make their fateful, historical rendezvous), he lapses into a vulgar reductionism, which thoroughly belies the sophisticated positions he has elsewhere advanced.1

1 He is quite capable of whirling in through the back door the classes he recently expelled from the front.
I have said enough to indicate that, in my view, the line in Cultural Studies which has attempted to think forwards from the best elements in the structuralist and culturalist enterprises, by way of some of the concepts elaborated in Gramsci’s work, comes closest to meeting the requirements of the field of study. And the reason for that should now also be obvious. Though neither structuralism nor culturalism will do, as self-sufficient paradigms of study, they have a centrality to the field which all the other contenders lack because, between them (in their divergences as well as their convergences) they address what must be the core problem of Cultural Studies. They constantly return us to the terrain marked out by those strongly coupled but not mutually exclusive concepts culture/ideology. They pose, together, the problems consequent on trying to think both the specificity of different practices and the forms of the articulated unity they constitute. They make a constant, if flawed, return to the base/superstructure metaphor. They are correct in insisting that this question—which comprises all the problems of a non-reductive determinacy—is the heart of the matter: and that, on the solution of this problem will turn the capacity of Cultural Studies to supercede the endless oscillations between idealism and reductionism. They confront—even if in radically opposed ways—the dialectic between conditions and consciousness. At another level, they pose the question of the relation between the logic of thinking and the ‘logic’ of historical process. They continue to hold out the promise of a properly materialist theory of culture. In their sustained and mutually reinforcing antagonisms they hold out no promise of an easy synthesis. But, between them, they define where, if at all, is the space, and what are the limits, within which such a synthesis might be constituted. In Cultural Studies, theirs are the ‘names of the game’.

Codes and cultural analysis

JOHN CORNER

‘We mean by code, for instance, a verbal language such as English, Italian or German; visual systems, such as traffic signals, road signals, card games, etc.; and so on.’

Umberto Eco.

Introduction

One of the most ambitious projects to be undertaken in the still disputed academic area of ‘cultural studies’ has been the connecting of the study of linguistic forms with the study of social structure, processes and behaviour. The relationship between society and language or, more broadly, symbolic structures, has long been an important element of social and anthropological research, but the new emphasis is one which seeks to obtain a precision of socio-cultural analysis in keeping both with the ‘scientific’ levels of systematic investigation achieved by modern linguistics and, quite often, the ‘scientific’ ambitions of much radical social theory. The system of a particular language and the system of the particular society which uses it are seen to be in an important, mutually determining relationship—such that linguistic study of a certain kind offers inroads into an understanding of a society and its characteristic processes. Linguistic paradigms have also been used in the study of a whole range of cultural phenomena, including those not previously thought of as having directly linguistic dimensions, such as photography, dress and aspects of social behaviour and organisation. A widened meaning of ‘language’ has emerged.

Many of the researchers who have addressed themselves to this broadly socio-linguistic enterprise (as well as work in sociolinguistics from a social science base there has been a range of structuralist, semiotic and literary critical influences) have had resort at some point or other to the notion of ‘code’, which they have used with varying degrees of emphasis and according to a number of definitions. In this article I propose to examine some of the problems of these usages, concentrating on dominant tendencies within the area of cultural studies/communication studies.

Codes

Although ‘code’ is widely used in general speech and writing to indicate levels of rule-system ranging from the closure of the morse-code (a tight set of correlations) to the relative openness and generality of a code of norms or of conduct (which might at times be describable as the unspoken and implicitly organised tendencies of behavioural propriety) in the area of linguistic social research something close to the idea of a set of rule-governed operations is usually indicated by the term. That is to say, the usage points towards something closer to the morse-code than to the normal

* Centre for Communication Studies, Liverpool University.

1 Many examples could be given of the centrality of the approach but perhaps Hall (1973) is most illustrative:

‘My purpose is to suggest that, in the analysis of culture, the inter-connection between societal structures and processes and formal or symbolic structures is absolutely pivotal.’